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Σ03 DETERMINACY AND Π
1
2 MONOTONE INDUCTION
SHERWOOD J. HACHTMAN
Abstract. Building on recent work of Philip Welch ([15], [16]), we prove that (light-
face) Σ03 determinacy is equivalent to the existence of a wellfounded model satisfying the
axiom scheme of (boldface) Π12 monotone induction.
§1. Introduction. In this paper, we isolate the strength of Σ03 determinacy
in terms of a natural theory in second order arithmetic. Namely, we show that
Σ03 -DET is equivalent over Π
1
1-CA0 to the existence of a countably-coded β-
model of Π12 monotone induction.
There is a great deal of precedent for equivalences between determinacy in low
levels of the Borel hierarchy and axioms of inductive definition. In one of the
first studies in reverse mathematics, Steel [12] proved over RCA0 that ATR0 is
equivalent to both ∆01 -DET and Σ
0
1 -DET. Tanaka [13] showed over ACA0 that
∆02 -DET is equivalent to Π
1
1-TR, and [14] that over ATR0, Σ
0
2 -DET is equiv-
alent to Σ11-MI. MedSalem and Tanaka [5] established equivalences over ATR0
between k−Π02 -DET and [Σ
1
1]
k-ID, an axiom allowing inductive definitions us-
ing combinations of k-many Σ11 operators; furthermore, they showed over Π
1
3-TI
that ∆03 -DET is equivalent to [Σ
1
1]
TR-ID, an axiom allowing inductive defini-
tion by combinations of transfinitely many Σ11 operators. Further results were
given by Tanaka and Yoshii [17] characterizing the strength of determinacy for
pointclasses refining the difference hierarchy on Π02, again in terms of axioms of
inductive definition.
Just beyond these pointclasses we have Σ03, where an exact characterization of
strength has been elusive. The sharpest published bounds on this strength were
given by Welch [15], who showed that although Σ03 -DET (and more) is provable
in Π13-CA0, ∆
1
3-CA0 (even augmented by AQI, an axiom allowing definition by
arithmetical quasi-induction) cannot prove Σ03 -DET. On the other hand, Mon-
talba´n and Shore [7] showed that Σ03 -DET (and indeed, any true Σ
1
4 sentence)
cannot prove ∆12-CA0. This situation is further clarified by the same authors in
[8], where they show (among other things) that Σ03 -DET implies the existence
of a β-model of ∆13-CA0.
Welch [16] went on to give a characterization of the ordinal stage at which
winning strategies in Σ03 games are constructed in L. There, the least ordinal γ
so that every Σ03 game is determined with a winning strategy definable over Lγ
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is shown to be the least γ for which there exists an illfounded admissible model
M with an infinite descending sequence of nonstandard levels of L that fully Σ2-
reflect to standard levels below γ, and so that wfo(M) = γ (see Definition 3.1).
Montalba´n asks, as Question 28 of [6], for a precise classification of the proof-
theoretic strength of Σ03 -DET. In light of the work of Welch and Montalba´n-
Shore, it appeared plausible that Σ03 -DET is actually equivalent to the existence
of a β-model of some natural theory in second order arithmetic. We felt that the
ordinal γ appearing as the wellfounded ordinal of Welch’s nonstandard structure
should be characterized as the least so that Lγ satisfies some form of monotone
induction. This is what we show: Lγ is the minimal model closed under Π
1
2
monotone inductive definitions, and indeed, Σ03 -DET is equivalent over Π
1
1-CA0
to the existence of such a model.
All published proofs of Σ03 determinacy trace back to Morton Davis’s [1] (for
relevant definitions, see Section 2). Let A ⊆ ωω be a Σ03 set, so that A =
⋃
k∈ω Bk
for some recursively presented sequence 〈Bk〉k∈ω of Π02 sets. The idea behind
the proof that the game G(A) is determined is a simple one: if Player I does not
have a winning strategy, then Player II refines to a quasistrategy W0 so that no
infinite plays in W0 belong to B0, and so that W0 doesn’t forfeit the game for
Player II (in the sense that I has no winning strategy in G(A;W0)). Having done
this, Player II plays insideW0 and at all positions of length 1, refines further to a
W1 which avoids B1 without forfeiting the game. Then refine to W2 at positions
of length 2, and so on. The ultimate refinement of the sequence W0,W1,W2 . . .
of quasistrategies gives a winning quasistrategy for Player II in G(A), since every
infinite play must eventually stay in each Wn, and so avoid each Bn.
The key claim that makes this proof work is Lemma 2.2 below, which asserts
that whenever Player I does not have a winning strategy in G(A;T ), then for all
k, there is such a quasistrategy Wk for II. Welch’s characterization amounts to
an analysis of the way in which these Wk first appear in L. Namely, if T ∈ Lγ is
such that I doesn’t have a winning strategy for G(A, T ) in Lγ , then the assumed
reflection of the ordinals of M ensures there is a quasistrategy W ∈ Lγ as in
the conclusion of the lemma. Furthermore, Welch defines a game that is won
by the Π03 player, but for which there can be no winning strategy in Lγ . In
this situation it is necessarily the case that the quasistrategies Wk from which
II’s winning strategy is built are constructed cofinally in Lγ , and the common
refinement is only definable over the model Lγ .
Welch’s proof of determinacy is difficult, and the quasistrategies of interest
are obtained in something of a nonstandard way. Our present aim is to give
a more constructive account of the way in which the quasistrategies Wk arise.
There is a relatively straightforward way in which Wk can obtained by iteration
of a certain monotone operator. The complexity of this operator is ¬aΣ03 in the
parameter T (here a is the game quantifier as defined in [9] 6D; ¬Γ denotes the
dual pointclass of Γ). It seemed natural to conjecture, then, that the ordinal γ is
in some sense a closure ordinal for these monotone inductive definitions (indeed,
Welch makes the conjecture in [16] that γ is o(aΠ03), the closure ordinal of non-
monotone aΠ03 inductive definitions; it appears however, based on the results
here, that γ < o(aΠ03)).
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In what follows, we denote subsets of ω by capital Roman letters X,Y, Z,
elements of ω by lowercase Roman letters from i up to n, ordinals by lowercase
Greek α, β, γ... and reals (elements of R = ωω) by w, x, y, z.
Definition 1.1. Let Γ be a pointclass. Γ-MI is the axiom scheme asserting,
for each Φ : P(ω)→ P(ω) which is a Γ operator, i.e.
{〈n,X〉 | n ∈ Φ(X)} ∈ Γ,
that is monotone, i.e.
(∀X,Y )X ⊆ Y → Φ(X) ⊆ Φ(Y ),
that there exists an ordinal o(Φ) and sequence 〈Φξ〉ξ≤o(Φ) such that, setting
Φ<ξ =
⋃
ζ<ξ Φ
ζ , we have
• for all ξ ≤ o(Φ), Φξ = Φ(Φ<ξ) ∪ Φ<ξ,
• Φo(Φ) = Φ<o(Φ), and
• o(Φ) is the least ordinal with this property.
Φo(Φ) is the least fixed point of Φ, denoted Φ∞.
There is a prewellorder ≺Φ with field Φ∞ ⊆ ω naturally associated with the
sequence 〈Φξ〉ξ≤o(Φ). Namely, set m ≺Φ n if and only if the least ξ with m ∈ Φ
ξ
is less than the least ζ with n ∈ Φζ .
We are interested in the case that Γ is one ofΠ12, Π
1
2(z) for a real z. We regard
Π12(z)-MI as being formalized in the language L2 of second order arithmetic: It
is the schema asserting the existence of the prewellorder ≺Φ, for each Π12(z)
monotone operator Φ. Note for such Φ, the relation “X =≺Φ”, as a relation
holding of X ∈ P(ω × ω), is arithmetical in Σ12(z).
It will follow from our analysis that γ is least so that Lγ |= (¬aΣ
0
3)-MI.
However, we argue to more directly show something stronger: that Lγ |= Π
1
2-MI.
(We remark that, as Σ03 -DET fails in Lγ , ¬aΣ
0
3 and aΠ
0
3 do not coincide there.)
For a deep analysis of iterated monotone ¬aΣ03 and Π
1
2 operators, we encourage
the reader to consult Martin’s [4].
In Section 2, we show that winning strategies in Σ03 games are definable over
any β-model of Π12-MI. In Section 3, we prove that Welch’s infinite depth Σ2-
nestings furnish us with such β-models. We complete this circle of implications
in Section 4 by reproducing Welch’s lower bound argument in the base theory
Π11-CA0 to show that Σ
0
3 determinacy implies the existence of an infinite depth
Σ2-nesting. We conclude with an analysis of theΠ
1
2 relations which are correctly
computed in Lγ : these are precisely the relations ¬aΣ
0
3 in parameters from Lγ .
§2. Proving determinacy. Let T be a (non-empty) tree with no terminal
nodes; [T ] denotes the set of infinite branches of T , and for p ∈ T , Tp denotes the
subtree of T with stem p, that is, Tp = {q ∈ T | q ⊆ p∨p ⊆ q}. For a set A ⊆ [T ],
the game on T with payoff A, denoted G(A;T ), is defined as the infinite perfect
information game in which two players, I and II, alternate choosing successive
nodes of a branch x of T ; we call such an infinite branch a play. Player I wins if
x ∈ A; otherwise, Player II wins. We write G(A) for G(A;ω<ω).
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A strategy for I in a game on T is a partial function σ : T ⇀ X that assigns
to an even-length position s ∈ T a legal move x for I at s, that is, x ∈ X so
that s⌢〈x〉 ∈ T . We require the domain of σ to be closed under legal moves
by II as well as moves by σ; note then that due to the presence of terminal
nodes in the tree, I needn’t have a strategy at all. Strategies for II are defined
analogously. If an infinite play x can be obtained by playing against a strategy
σ, we say x is according to or compatible with σ. We say a strategy σ is winning
for Player I (II) in G(A;T ) if every play according to σ belongs to A ([T ] \ A).
A game G(A;T ) is determined if one of the players has a winning strategy. For
a pointclass Γ, Γ-DET denotes the statement that G(A;ω<ω) is determined for
all A ⊆ ωω in Γ.
We furthermore define a quasistrategy for Player II in T to be a subtree W ⊆
T , again with no terminal nodes, that does not restrict Player I’s moves, in
the sense that whenever p ∈ W has even length, then every 1-step extension
p⌢〈s〉 ∈ T belongs to W . A quasistrategy may then be thought of as a multi-
valued strategy. (Similar definitions of course can be made for Player I, but at
no point will we need to refer to quasistrategies for Player I.)
Quasistrategies are typically obtained in the following fashion: if Player I does
not have a winning strategy in G(A;T ), then setting W to be the collection of
p ∈ T so that I doesn’t have a winning strategy in G(A;Tp), we have that W
is a quasistrategy for II in T . This W is called II’s nonlosing quasistrategy in
G(A;T ).
Theorem 2.1. Let M be a β-model of Π12-MI. Then for any Σ
0
3(z) set A,
where z ∈ M, either
1. Player I wins G(A) with a strategy σ ∈M; or
2. Player II wins G(A) with a strategy ∆13(z)-definable over M.
Lemma 2.2. Let z be a real and work in Π12(z)-MI+Π
1
2-CA0. Suppose T ⊆ ω
<ω
is a tree, recursive in z, with no terminal nodes, and fix B ⊆ A ⊆ [T ] with
B ∈ Π02(z) and A ∈ ∆
1
1(z). If p ∈ T is such that I does not have a winning
strategy in G(A;Tp), then there is a quasistrategy W for II in Tp so that
• [W ] ∩B = ∅, and
• I does not have a winning strategy in G(A;W ).
In keeping with terminology first established in [1], we say a position p for
which such a quasistrategyW exists is good and thatW is a goodness-witnessing
quasistrategy for p (relative to T,B,A).
We remark that Π12-CA0 implies ∆
1
2-CA0, which is equivalent to Σ
1
2-AC0 (see
VII.6.9 in [11]); this choice principle will be used several times in the course of
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Fix a set U ⊆ ω × T recursive in z so that, setting
Un = {p ∈ T | (n, p) ∈ U} and Dn = {x ∈ [T ] | (∃k)x ↾ k ∈ Un}, we have
B =
⋂
n∈ωDn. For convenience, we may further assume that each Un is closed
under end-extension in T (i.e., if p ⊆ q ∈ T and p ∈ Un, then q ∈ Un), and that
|p| > n whenever p ∈ Un.
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We define an operator Φ : P(T )→ P(T ) by setting, for X ⊆ T ,
p ∈ Φ(X) ⇐⇒ (∃n)(∀σ) if σ is a strategy for I in T , then
(∃x)x is compatible with σ, x /∈ A, and(∀k)x ↾ k /∈ Un \X.
The operator Φ is clearly monotone on P(T ), and the relation p ∈ Φ(X) is Π12(z)
because this last pointclass is closed under existential quantification over ω (by
Σ12-AC0). We can write this more compactly by introducing an auxiliary game
where Player I tries either to get into A, or to at some finite stage enter the set
Un while avoiding X : Define for X ⊆ T and n ∈ ω,
EXn = A ∪ {x ∈ [T ] | (∃k)x ↾ k ∈ Un \X}.
Then
p ∈ Φ(X) ⇐⇒ (∃n) I doesn’t have a winning strategy in G(EXn ;Tp).
Now by Π12(z)-MI let 〈Φ
α〉α≤o(Φ) be the iteration of the operator Φ with least
fixed point Φ∞. (Note this is our sole use of the main strength assumption of the
lemma, Π12(z)-MI.) Let ≺Φ be the associated prewellorder of Φ
∞ ⊆ ω; formally,
we regard definitions and proofs in terms of 〈Φα〉α≤o(Φ) as being carried out in
the theoryΠ12-CA0 of second order arithmetic, using the real ≺Φ as a parameter.
Claim 2.3. If p ∈ T \ Φ∞, then I has a winning strategy in G(A;Tp).
Proof. For each q ∈ T \Φ∞ and n ∈ ω, we let σq,n be a winning strategy for
I in G(EΦ
∞
n ;Tq), as is guaranteed to exist by the fact that q /∈ Φ(Φ
∞) = Φ∞. By
Σ12-AC0, we may fix a real ~σ coding a sequence of such, so that (~σ)〈q,n〉 = σq,n
for all such pairs q, n.
Supposing now that p ∈ T \ Φ∞, we describe a strategy σ for Player I in
Tp from the parameter ~σ as follows. Set p0 = p. Let n0 be the least n so
that p0 /∈ Un (such exists by our simplifying assumption that |q| > n whenever
q ∈ Un). Suppose inductively that we have reached some position pi /∈ Φ∞ and
have fixed ni such that pi /∈ Uni . Play according to σpi,ni until, if ever, we reach
a position q ∈ Uni \ Φ
∞. Then set pi+1 = q, and let ni+1 be least such that
pi+1 /∈ Uni+1 .
Note the strategy just described is arithmetical in the parameters z, ~σ, and so
exists; call it σ. We claim σ is winning for I in G(A;Tp).
Let x ∈ [Tp] be a play compatible with σ. Then n0, p0 are defined. If ni+1 is
undefined for some i, then fixing the least such i, we must have that no initial
segment of x belongs to Uni \ Φ
∞. So x is compatible with the strategy σpi,ni ;
since this strategy is winning in G(EΦ
∞
ni
;Tpi), we must have that x ∈ E
Φ∞
ni
. But
then x ∈ A, by definition of the set EΦ
∞
ni
.
On the other hand, if ni is defined for all i, then by definition of the strategy
σ, we have pi ⊆ x for all i, and for each i, pi ∈
⋂
n<ni
Un (here we use that the
sets Un are closed under end-extension in T ). So x ∈
⋂
n∈ωDn = B ⊆ A.
We have shown σ is winning for Player I in G(A;Tp). ⊣
Claim 2.4. If p ∈ Φ∞, then p is good.
Proof. The construction of a quasistrategy W p witnessing goodness of p
proceeds inductively on the ordinal rank of p ∈ Φ∞, that is, on the least α so
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that p ∈ Φα. Namely, given such p, α, there is some n so that I does not have
a winning strategy in the game G(EΦ
<α
n ;Tp). In W
p, have II play according to
II’s non-losing quasistrategy in G(EΦ
<α
n ;Tp) until, if ever, a position q in Un is
reached. Since this non-losing quasistrategy must avoid Un \ Φ<α by definition
of EΦ
<α
n , we must have q ∈ Φ
<α; inductively, we have some goodness-witnessing
quasistrategy W q for q, so have II switch to play according to this strategy.
Here is a more formal definition of the quasistrategy W p. For p ∈ Φ∞, define
W p to be the set of positions q ∈ Tp for which there exists some sequence
〈(αi, ni)〉|p|≤i≤|q| so that, whenever |p| ≤ i ≤ |q|,
• if i = |p|, or i > |p| and q ↾ i ∈ Uni−1 , then
– αi is the least α so that q ↾ i ∈ Φα;
– ni is the least n so that I has no winning strategy in G(E
Φ<αi
n ;Tq↾i);
• if i > |p| and q ↾ i /∈ Uni−1 , then αi = αi−1, ni = ni−1; and
• if i < |q|, then q ↾ (i+1) is in II’s non-losing quasistrategy inG(EΦ
<αi
ni
;Tq↾i).
Note that formally, we should regard quantification of ordinals α < o(Φ) as
ranging over natural number codes for such as furnished by the prewellorder
≺Φ. The most complicated clauses in the above definition are those involving
assertions of the form “I has no winning strategy in the game G(EΦ
<αi
n ;Tq↾i)”,
and such are Π12 in the parameter ≺Φ. So the criterion for membership in W
p
is arithmetical in Σ12(≺Φ) conditions, and therefore by Π
1
2-CA0 the set W
p is
guaranteed to exist.
We need to verify W p is a quasistrategy for Player II in Tp. An easy in-
duction shows that for each q ∈ W p, there is a unique witnessing sequence
〈(αi, ni)〉|p|≤i≤|q| and this sequence depends continuously on q; that the αi are
non-increasing; and that I has no winning strategy in G(EΦ
<αi
ni
;Tq↾i) whenever
|p| ≤ i ≤ |q|.
For q ∈W p, we let αq, nq denote the final pair (indexed by |q|) in the sequence
witnessing this membership. By the above remarks, I has no winning strategy
in G(EΦ
<αq
nq ;Tq), and by the final condition for membership in W
p, the one-step
extensions q⌢〈l〉 inW p are exactly the one-step extensions of q in II’s non-losing
quasistrategy in this game. It follows that W p is a quasistrategy for II in Tp.
We claim W p witnesses goodness of p. We first show [W p]∩B = ∅. Given any
play x ∈ [W p], we have some least i so that αj = αi for all j ≥ i; then for all
j > i, we have x ↾ j belongs to II’s non-losing quasistrategy in G(EΦ
<αi
ni
;Tx↾i).
In particular, for no k do we have x ↾ k ∈ Uni . Then x /∈ Dni , so x /∈ B as
needed.
We just need to show I has no winning strategy in G(A;W pq ), for each q ⊇ p in
W p. We argue by induction on αq. So assume that there is no winning strategy
for I in G(A;W pr ) whenever α
r < αq .
Suppose towards a contradiction that σ is a winning strategy for I inG(A;W pq ).
Let j be least so that αq = αj . Then q is in II’s non-losing quasistrategy in
G(EΦ
<αj
nj
;Tq↾j). We claim no r ⊇ q compatible with σ is in Unj . For otherwise,
we have r ∈ Φ<αj , so that αr < αj = αq, and σ is a winning strategy for I in
G(A;W pr ). This contradicts our inductive hypothesis.
Σ03 DETERMINACY AND Π
1
2 MONOTONE INDUCTION 7
So σ cannot reach any position in Unj . By our definition of W
p, we have that
the strategy σ stays inside II’s non-losing quasistrategy for G(EΦ
<αj
nj
;Tq↾j). But
since σ is winning for I in G(A;Tq↾j) and A ⊆ EΦ
<αj
nj
, this is a contradiction.
We conclude that I has no winning strategy in G(A;W pq ); inductively, the
claim follows for all q ∈ W p extending p, so that in particular, W p witnesses
goodness of p. ⊣
The last two claims show that every p ∈ T is either a winning position for I in
G(A;T ), or is good. This proves the lemma. ⊣
For future reference, let us refer to theW p defined in the proof as the canonical
goodness-witnessing strategy for p (relative to T,B,A). We have the following
remark, which will be important in computing the complexity of winning strate-
gies:
Remark 2.5. Since “≺Φ witnesses the instance of Π12(z)-MI at Φ” is ∆
1
3(z),
the statement “W is the canonical goodness-witnessing strategy for p relative to
T,B,A” is likewise ∆13(z) as a relation on pairs 〈W, p〉.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof proceeds from Lemma 2.2 as usual (see
[1], [3]); we give a detailed account here, in order to isolate the claimed defin-
ability of II’s winning strategy.
Fix a β-model M of Π12-MI. Suppose A is Σ
0
3(z) for some z ∈ M; say A =⋃
k∈ω Bk. By the previous lemma, whenever T ∈ M is a tree inM, and p ∈ T is
a position so that inM, there is no winning strategy for I in G(A;Tp), then p is
good relative to T,Bk, A, for all k; that is, for each k there is Wk a quasistrategy
for II in Tp so that
• [Wk] ∩B = ∅;
• I does not have a winning strategy in G(A;Wk).
The idea of the proof is to repeatedly apply the lemma inside M. At positions
p of length k, II refines her present working quasistrategy Wk−1 to one Wk
witnessing goodness of p relative toWk−1, Bk, A, so “dodging” each of the Π
0
2(z)
sets Bk, one at a time.
More precisely: suppose I does not win G(A) in M, where A is Σ03(z) for
some z ∈ M. Let W ∅ be the canonical goodness-witnessing quasistrategy for ∅
relative to ω<ω, B0, A as constructed in the proof of Lemma 2.2. Then let H
∅
be II’s non-losing quasistrategy in G(A;W ∅) (so that for no p ∈ H∅ do we have
that I wins G(A;W ∅p )).
Suppose inductively that for some k, we have subtrees Hp of T , defined for a
subset of p ∈ T with length ≤ k, so that
1. each Hp is a quasistrategy for II in Tp and belongs to M;
2. [Hp] ∩B|p| = ∅;
3. for no q ∈ Hp does I have a winning strategy in G(A;Hpq );
4. if p ⊆ q, then Hq ⊆ Hp whenever both are defined;
5. if |p| < k and p⌢〈l〉 ∈ Hp, then Hp
⌢〈l〉 is defined.
In order to continue the construction, we need to define quasistrategies Hp
⌢〈l〉,
whenever |p| = k, Hp is defined, and p⌢〈l〉 ∈ Hp. Given such p and l, we have
that I has no winning strategy in G(A;Hp
p⌢〈l〉) by (3). So applying Lemma 2.2
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inside M, let W p
⌢〈l〉 be the canonical goodness-witnessing strategy for p⌢〈l〉
relative to Hp, Bk+1, A. Then let H
p⌢〈l〉 be II’s non-losing quasistrategy in
G(A;W p
⌢〈l〉). It is easy to see that this quasistrategy satisfies the properties
(1)-(4), so we have the desired system of quasistrategies Hq satisfying (5), for
|q| = k + 1.
Now set p ∈ H if and only if for all i < |p|, Hp↾i is defined and p ∈ Hp↾i. It
follows from (5) that H is a quasistrategy for II, and by (4) we have H ⊆ Hp
for each p ∈ H . By (2) then, [H ] ∩Bk = ∅ for all k ∈ ω, so that [H ] ∩A = ∅.
Observe that for each p ∈ H , we have that the sequence 〈Hp↾i〉i<|p| exists in
M, since it is obtained by a finite number of applications of Π12-MI and Π
1
2-CA0.
SinceM is a β-model, it really is the case (in V ) that [H ]∩Bk = ∅ for all k ∈ ω.
Though H need not belong to M, we claim it is nonetheless a ∆13(z)-definable
class over M. For p ∈ H if and only if there exists a sequence 〈Wi, Hi〉i<|p|, so
that for all i < |p|,
• Wi is II’s canonical goodness-witnessing strategy for p ↾ i, relative to
Hi−1, Bi, A (where we set H−1 = ω
<ω);
• Hi is II’s non-losing quasistrategy in G(A;Wi) at p ↾ i;
• for all i < |p|, p ∈ Hi.
This is a Σ13(z) condition, by Remark 2.5. And note that p /∈ H if and only if
there is a sequence 〈Hi,Wi〉i≤l, for some l < |p|, satisfying the first two conditions
for i ≤ l, but so that p /∈ Hl. This is likewise Σ
1
3(z), so that H is ∆
1
3(z)-definable
in M.
Given a ∆13(z) definition of the quasistrategy H , it is easy to see that the
strategy τ for II obtained by taking τ(p) to be the least l so that p⌢〈l〉 ∈ H
is likewise ∆13(z) and winning for II in G(A;T ). This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.1. ⊣
§3. Π1
2
monotone induction from infinite depth Σ2-nestings. In this
section, the theories of KP and Σ1-Comprehension are defined in the language
of set theory as usual. We will furthermore make use of the theories KPI0, which
asserts that every set is contained in some admissible set (that is, some transitive
model of KP), and KPI, which is the union of KP and KPI0. KPI0 is relevant
largely because it is a weak theory in which Shoenfield absoluteness holds; in
particular, Π1
2
expressions are equivalent over KPI0 to Π1 statements in the
language of set theory.
We remark that KPI0 and Π
1
1-CA0 prove the same statements of second order
arithmetic. Since we primarily work with models in the language of set theory
in this section, we take KPI0 as our base theory, but all of the results proved
here can be appropriately reformulated as statements about countably coded
β-models in second order arithmetic (as in Chapter VII of [11]).
For M an illfounded model in the language of set theory, we identify the
wellfounded part of M with its transitive collapse, denote this wfp(M), and set
wfo(M) = wfp(M) ∩ON. Recall we say M is an ω-model if ω < wfo(M). The
following definition is due to Welch [16].
Σ03 DETERMINACY AND Π
1
2 MONOTONE INDUCTION 9
Definition 3.1. For M an illfounded ω-model of KP in the language of set
theory, an infinite depth Σ2-nesting based on M is a sequence 〈ζn, sn〉n∈ω of
pairs so that for all n ∈ ω,
1. ζn ≤ ζn+1 < wfo(M),
2. sn ∈ ON
M \wfo(M),
3. M |= sn+1 < sn,
4. (Lζn ≺Σ2 Lsn)
M.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose γ1 ≤ γ2 < δ2 < δ1 are ordinals so that
1. Lγ1 ≺Σ1 Lδ1 ;
2. Lγ2 ≺Σ2 Lδ2 ;
3. δ1 is the least admissible ordinal above δ2;
4. For all α ≤ δ2, Lα Σω-projects to ω.
Then Lγ2 satisfies Π
1
2(z)-MI, for all reals z ∈ Lγ1 .
Item (4) simply asserts that for every α, there is a subset of ω definable over
Lα that doesn’t belong to Lα; this simplifying assumption ensures that every Lα
is countable, as witnessed by a surjection f : ω → Lα that belongs to Lα+1. Note
the least level of L that does not Σω-project to ω is a model of ZF
−; since this is
far beyond the strength of the theories considered here, we don’t lose anything
by assuming (4).
Proof. Let Φ : P(ω) → P(ω) be a Π12(z) monotone operator in Lγ2 ; fix a
Π01(z) condition T so that
n ∈ Φ(X) ⇐⇒ Lγ2 |= (∀x)(∃y)T (n,X, x, y, z)
whenever n ∈ ω and X ∈ P(ω) ∩ Lγ2 . Notice that for such X
n ∈ Φ(X) ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ Lγ2)(∃y)T (n,X, x, y, z),
by absoluteness and because γ2 is a limit of admissibles. Regarding the operator
defined in this way, “n ∈ Φ(X)” makes sense even for sets X /∈ Lγ2 (though this
extended Φ may fail to be monotone when applied to sets not in Lγ2).
For each ordinal η, we define the approximation Φη as the operator Φ rela-
tivized to Lη,
n ∈ Φη(X) ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ Lη)(∃y)T (n,X, x, y, z).
The point is that the operator Φη is then Σ
1
1 in any real parameter coding the
countable set R ∩ Lη (for example, Th(Lη), the characteristic function of the
theory of Lη under some standard coding), and so each Φη will be correctly
computed in, e.g., Lα for α a limit of admissibles above η.
Obviously Φ = Φγ2 , so is monotone in Lγ2 . But for η 6= γ2 we may not even
have that the operators Φη are monotone on P(ω)∩Lη. So we instead work with
the obvious “monotonizations”,
n ∈ Ψη(X) ⇐⇒ (∃X
′ ⊆ X)n ∈ Φη(X
′)
⇐⇒ (∃X ′ ⊆ X)(∀x ∈ Lη)(∃y)T (n,X
′, x, y, z).
These are again Σ11(Th(Lη), z), and Ψγ2(X) = Φγ2(X) = Φ(X) for X ∈ Lγ2 .
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Let 〈Ψξη〉ξ≤o(Ψη) be the sequence obtained via iterated application of the oper-
ator Ψη, as in Definition 1.1. The most important properties of these sequences
are captured in the following two claims.
Claim 3.3. If η < η′, then (∀X)Ψη(X) ⊇ Ψη′(X).
Proof. Suppose n ∈ Ψη′(X); then
(∃X ′ ⊆ X)(∀x ∈ Lη′)(∃y)T (n,X
′, x, y, z),
and any such X ′ will likewise be a witness to n ∈ Ψη(X), since the latter is
defined the same way but with the universal quantifier bounded by the smaller
set Lη. ⊣
Claim 3.4. Suppose ξ < ξ′ and η < η′. Then
1. Ψξη ⊆ Ψ
ξ′
η ;
2. Ψξη ⊇ Ψ
ξ
η′ .
Proof. (1) is by definition. (2) follows from induction and the chain of in-
clusions, for X ⊇ Y ,
Ψη′(Y ) ⊆ Ψη′(X) ⊆ Ψη(X),
the first by monotonicity of Ψη′ , the second by the previous claim. ⊣
So the array 〈Ψξη〉 is increasing in ξ and decreasing in η. Applying this claim
with ξ = ω1, we have Ψ
ξ
η = Ψ
∞
η , so that Ψ
∞
η ⊇ Ψ
∞
η′ whenever η < η
′.
We now consider definability issues with respect to the operators Ψη and the
associated sequences, with the aim of showing the levels of L under consideration
are sufficiently closed to correctly compute these objects, and ultimately ensuring
that the sequences 〈Ψξη〉ξ≤o(Ψη) converge to the sequence of interest 〈Ψ
ξ
γ2
〉ξ≤o(Ψγ2)
as η → γ2.
Note that the hypothesis Lγ2 ≺Σ2 Lδ2 implies Lγ2 is a model of Σ2-KP. The
assumed elementarity in the lemma then implies each of γ1, γ2, δ2 is a limit of
Σ2-admissible ordinals.
Claim 3.5. Suppose z ∈ Lα and Lα |= KPI. Then the relation “n ∈ Ψξη” (as
a relation on 〈n, ξ, η〉 ∈ ω × α × α) is ∆Lα1 in the parameter z. Consequently,
for all η < α and ν < α, the sequence 〈Ψξη〉ξ<ν belongs to Lα.
Proof. The relation n ∈ Ψη(X) is, as remarked above, Σ11(z,Th(Lη)) on
n,X , and so is Π1 over the least admissible set containing z, η. Since every set
is contained in some admissible set Lβ with β < α, we have that “n ∈ Ψη(X)” is
∆1(z) over Lα. The last part of the claim then follows from Σ1-recursion inside
Lα, using the ∆
Lα
1 (z)-definability of the relation Y = Ψη(X). ⊣
Claim 3.6. Suppose z ∈ Lα, η < α and Lα is a model of Σ1-Comprehension.
Then o(Ψη) < α, and 〈Ψξη〉ξ≤o(Ψη) ∈ Lα. Moreover, the relation n ∈ Ψ
∞
η (on
ω × α) is ∆Lα1 (z).
Proof. Note such Lα satisfies KPI, so by the previous claim together with
Σ1-Comprehension, Pη = {n ∈ ω | (∃ξ < α)n ∈ Ψξη} ∈ Lα. By admissibility, the
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map on Pη sending n to the least ξ such that n ∈ Ψξη is bounded in α, and the
claim is immediate. The last assertion holds because in Lα,
n ∈ Ψ∞η ⇐⇒ (∃ξ)n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η ⇐⇒ (∀ξ)(Ψ
ξ
η = Ψ
ξ+1
η → n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η).
⊣
Claim 3.7. Suppose z ∈ Lα, and that α is a limit of ordinals β so that Lβ is
a model of Σ1-Comprehension. Then the relation n ∈ Ψ∞η is ∆
Lα
1 (z).
Proof. Immediate from the previous claim and the fact that the sequences
are correctly computed in models of KPI0. ⊣
Claim 3.8. If ξ < γ2, then for some η0 < γ2 we have Ψ
ξ
η0
= Ψξγ2 ; furthermore,
〈Ψζγ2〉ζ<ξ ∈ Lγ2 .
Note that then for this η0, Ψ
ξ
η0
= Ψξη whenever η0 ≤ η < δ2.
Proof. The set Qξ = {n ∈ ω | (∃η < γ2)n /∈ Ψξη} is a member of Lγ2 by
Σ1-Comprehension there. Now the map sending n ∈ Qξ to the least η such
that n /∈ Ψξη is ∆1, so by admissibility, is bounded by some η0 < α. Recall the
sequence 〈Ψξη〉η∈ON is decreasing in η; so
n ∈ Ψξη0 ⇐⇒ Lγ2 |= (∀η)n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η ⇐⇒ Lδ2 |= (∀η)n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η
=⇒ n ∈ Ψξγ2 =⇒ n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η0
.
Note we have used the fact that Lγ2 ≺Σ1 Lδ2 . For the last part of the claim,
consider the map sending ζ < ξ to the least η0 such that (∀η > η0)Ψ
ζ
η = Ψ
ζ
η0
.
This map is Π1-definable, so by Σ2-Collection in Lγ2 , we have a bound η¯ < γ2,
and for each ζ < ξ, Ψζη¯ = Ψ
ζ
γ2
. By Claim 3.5 the sequence 〈Ψζη¯〉ζ<ξ = 〈Ψ
ζ
γ2
〉ζ<ξ
is in Lγ2 . ⊣
Claim 3.9. For all ξ < γ2, Ψ
ξ
γ2
= Ψξδ2 ; consequently, Ψ
<γ2
γ2
= Ψ<γ2δ2 .
Proof. By using induction on ξ and since Ψ<ξγ2 ∈ Lγ2 by the previous claim,
it is sufficient to show Ψγ2(X) = Ψδ2(X) whenever X ∈ Lγ2 . We already know
⊇ holds.
So suppose n ∈ Ψγ2(X). Then we have n ∈ Φγ2(X) = Φ(X), by monotonicity
of Φ = Φγ2 in Lγ2. So
Lγ2 |= (∀x)(∃y)T (n,X, x, y, z)
so that by Σ1-elementarity (this is enough, since Π
1
2 relations are Π
KPI0
1 ), Lδ2
models the same. Thus n ∈ Ψδ2(X) (with witness X
′ = X). ⊣
We haven’t yet used the full strength of Lγ2 ≺Σ2 Lδ2 , nor, for that matter, any
of the assumptions on γ1, δ1. We appeal to the first assumption to show that in
fact o(Ψδ2) ≤ γ2; the second will be used to show that Ψ
∞
δ2
= Ψ∞γ2 , and it will
follow that the operator Ψγ2 (which is equal to Φ, remember) stabilizes inside
Lγ2 .
Notice that by Claim 3.8, Ψξγ2 =
⋂
η<γ2
Ψξη for all ξ < γ2. So
Ψ<γ2γ2 = {n ∈ ω | (∃ξ < γ2)(∀η < γ2)n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η}.
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This set is Σ2-definable over Lγ2 . By the fact that Ψ
γ2
δ2
⊆ Ψγ2η for all η < δ2, we
have
Ψγ2δ2 ⊆ {n ∈ ω | (∀η < δ2)n ∈ Ψ
γ2
η } ⊆ {n ∈ ω | (∃ξ < δ2)(∀η < δ2)n ∈ Ψ
ξ
η}.
By the assumed Σ2-elementarity Lγ2 ≺Σ2 Lδ2 , this last set is precisely Ψ
<γ2
γ2
.
We obtain
Ψγ2δ2 ⊆ Ψ
<γ2
γ2
= Ψ<γ2δ2 ⊆ Ψ
γ2
δ2
so that Ψγ2δ2 = Ψ
<γ2
δ2
is the least fixed point of Ψδ2 , Ψ
<γ2
γ2
= Ψ∞δ2 .
Claim 3.10. Ψ∞δ2 = Ψ
∞
γ2
.
Proof. As usual, we know⊆ holds since γ2 < δ2. We have Ψ∞δ2 = Ψ
<γ2
γ2
∈ Lδ2 .
Suppose n /∈ Ψ∞δ2 . Then
Lδ1 |= (∃η)(∃P )(∀m ∈ ω)(m ∈ Ψη(P )→ m ∈ P ) ∧ n /∈ P,
with η = δ2 and P = Ψ
∞
δ2
. Recall “m ∈ Ψη(P )”, being a Σ
1
1 statement about
m,Th(Lη), P , is Π1 over any admissible set containing η, z, P . Since Lδ1 is
assumed to be admissible, the relation above is then Σ1 in Lδ1 . It therefore
reflects to Lγ1 (recall that z, the parameter from which everything is defined, is
assumed to belong to Lγ1). But then n /∈ Ψ
∞
η for some η < γ1; hence n /∈ Ψ
∞
γ2
. ⊣
So the least fixed points Φ∞ = Ψ∞γ2 and Ψ
∞
δ2
are equal. The argument just
given shows the relation n /∈ Φ∞ is Σ1 over Lδ1 , hence over Lγ1 ; in any event,
the set Φ∞ belongs to Lγ2 (using Σ1-Comprehension in Lγ2 in the case that
γ1 = γ2).
Finally, we claim o(Φ) < γ2. The map defined in Lγ2 that takes n ∈ Φ
∞ = Ψ∞γ2
to the least ξ such that (∃η0)(∀η > η0)n ∈ Ψξη is Σ2-definable, and so by Σ2-
Collection is bounded in γ2. Since for each ξ < γ2 we have Φ
ξ = Ψξγ2 = Ψ
ξ
η0
for
some η0 < γ2, this implies o(Φ) < γ2.
That 〈Φξ〉ξ≤o(Φ) belongs to Lγ2 now follows from the last assertion of Claim 3.8.
This completes the proof that the desired instance of Π12(z)-MI holds in Lγ2 . ⊣
Theorem 3.11. Suppose M is an illfounded ω-model of KP with 〈ζn, sn〉n∈ω
an infinite depth Σ2-nesting based on M, and that M is locally countable, in the
sense that every LMa has ultimate projectum ω in M. Then if β = supn∈ω ζn,
we have Lβ |= Π
1
2-MI.
Proof. If β = ζn for some n ∈ ω, then we obtain the result immediately by
applying the lemma in M to the tuple 〈ζn, ζn+1, sn+1, sn〉. So we can assume
〈ζn〉n∈ω is strictly increasing. Let Φ : P(ω) → P(ω) be Π
1
2(z) and monotone
in Lβ for some z ∈ Lβ , and let ζn be sufficiently large that z ∈ Lζn . Now
Lζn+1 ≺Σ1 Lβ and both models satisfy KPI0, so that whenever X ⊆ ω is in
Lζn+1 , we have
Lβ |= n ∈ Φ(X) ⇐⇒ Lζn+1 |= n ∈ Φ(X).
In particular, Lζn+1 believes Φ is Π
1
2(z) and monotone, so that by the lemma
applied to the tuple 〈ζn, ζn+1, sn+1, sn〉, we have o(Φ) < ζn+1, and the sequence
〈Φξ〉ξ≤o(Φ) (which is computed identically in Lζn+1 and Lβ) belongs to Lζn+1 . ⊣
Combining Theorems 2.1 and 3.11, we obtain
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Corollary 3.12. If M, β are as in the previous theorem, then for any Σ03(z)
set with z ∈ Lβ, either
1. Player I wins G(A) with a strategy σ ∈ Lβ; or
2. Player II wins G(A) with a strategy ∆13(z)-definable over Lβ.
§4. Infinite depth Σ2-nestings from determinacy. In this section we
show in the base theory Π11-CA0 that Σ
0
3-DET implies the existence of models
bearing infinite depth Σ2 nestings. The arguments are mostly cosmetic modifi-
cations of those given in Welch’s [15]. The most significant adjustment is to the
Friedman-style game, Welch’s Gψ, which is here tailored to allow the proof of
the implication to be carried out in Π11-CA0.
For α an ordinal, let Tα2 denote the lightface Σ2-theory of Lα, i.e.,
Tα2 = {σ | σ is a Σ2 sentence without parameters, and Lα |= σ}.
We will also abuse this notation slightly by applying it to nonstandard ordinals
b, so that if b ∈ ONM \wfo(M), T b2 denotes the Σ2-theory of (Lb)
M. It will
always be clear from context which illfounded model M this b comes from.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose M is an illfounded ω-model of KP such that (La)M |=
“all sets are countable”, for every a ∈ ONM. Set β = wfo(M). Suppose for
all nonstandard ordinals a of M, there exists some <M-smaller nonstandard
M-ordinal b so that T b2 ⊆ T
β
2 . Then there is an infinite depth Σ2 nesting based
on M.
Proof. This is essentially shown in Claim (5) in Section 3 of [15]. We outline
the shorter approach suggested there.
Suppose b is a nonstandard M-ordinal with T b2 ⊆ T
β
2 . By the assumption of
local countability in levels of LM, we have a uniformly Σ2-definable Σ2 Skolem
function, which we denote hb2 (see [2]). The set H = h
b
2[ω
<ω] is transitive in M,
since for any x ∈ H , the <ML -least surjection of ω onto x is in H , and since M
is an ω-model, the range of this surjection is a subset of H . Since H |= V = L,
we have by condensation in M that H = Lγb ≺Σ2 Lb for some γb ≤
M b.
We claim that γb < β. For suppose not, so there is some nonstandard ordinal
c of Lb in Lγb . Let f be the <
M
L -least surjection from ω onto c. Then f = h
b
2(k)
for some k ∈ ω, and for m,n ∈ ω, the sentences “h2(k) exists, is a function from
ω onto some ordinal, and h2(k)(m) ∈ h2(k)(n)” are Σ2. But since T b2 ⊆ T
β
2 ,
this would imply hβ2 (k)(m) ∈ h
β
2 (k)(n) whenever f(m) ∈ f(n) in (Lb)
M. This
contradicts the wellfoundedness of β.
The lemma now follows by choosing some descending sequence 〈bn〉n∈ω of non-
standard ordinals ofM with T bn2 ⊆ T
β
2 for all n, and setting γn = suph
bn
2 [ω
<ω] <
β. Since the γn are true ordinals, we can choose some non-decreasing subsequence
〈γnk〉k∈ω , and 〈γnk , bnk〉k∈ω is the desired infinite depth Σ2-nesting. ⊣
Theorem 4.2. Work in Π11-CA0. If Σ
0
3-determinacy holds, then there is a
model M for which there exists an infinite depth Σ2-nesting based on M.
Corollary 4.3. Work in Π11-CA0. Σ
0
3-determinacy implies the existence of
a β-model of Π12-MI; indeed, Lγ |= Π
1
2-MI for some countable ordinal γ.
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Proof. Immediate, combining Theorem 4.2 with Theorem 3.11. ⊣
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We define a variant of Welch’s game Gψ from [15].
Players I and II play complete consistent theories in the language of set theory,
fI, fII, respectively, extending
V = L + KP + ρω = ω.(∗)
These theories uniquely determine term models MI,MII. Player I loses if MI
has nonstandard ω; similarly, if MI is an ω-model and MII is not, then Player
II loses. (Note that this is a Boolean combination of Σ02 conditions on fI, fII.)
The remainder of the winning condition assumesMI,MII are both ω-models.
Player I wins if any of the following hold.
1. fII ∈ MI, or fI = fII.
2. (∃β ≤ ONMI)(∃a ∈ ONMII)(∀n ∈ ω)(∃〈ai, si〉i≤n) so that, for all i < n,
• a0 = a and ai ∈ ON
MII ,
• (ai+1 < ai)MII ,
• σi is the first Σ2 formula (in some fixed recursive list of all formulas in
the language of set theory) so that LMIβ 6|= σi and L
MII
ai
|= σi;
• if ai is a successor ordinal inMII, then ai+1 is the largest limit ordinal
of MII below ai;
• if ai is a limit ordinal in MII, and σi is the formula ∃u∀vψ(u, v), then
ai+1 is least in ON
MII so that (∃u ∈ Lai+1)(Lai |= ∀vψ(u, v)) in MII.
Note that if (2) holds, then MII must be an illfounded model: If β, a witness
the condition, then the sequences 〈ai, σi〉i≤n are uniquely determined for each
n, and are inclusionwise increasing in n; then 〈ai〉i∈ω is an infinite descending
sequence of MII-ordinals.
Note also that this condition is Σ03 as a condition on fI, fII. Strictly speak-
ing, the quantifiers overMI, ON
MII , etc. should be regarded as natural number
quantifiers ranging over the indices of defining formulas for members of the mod-
elsMI,MII. Clause (1) is then Σ
0
2, and (2) is Σ
0
3, since each bulleted item there
is recursive in codes for the objects β, a, 〈ai, σi〉i≤n and the pair 〈fI, fII〉.
Denote the set of runs which I wins by F ; so F is Σ03.
Claim 4.4. Player I has no winning strategy in G(F ).
Proof. Suppose instead that I has some winning strategy in this game. By
Shoenfield absoluteness (which holds inΠ11-CA0, see [11]) there is such a winning
strategy σ in L. Let α be the least admissible ordinal so that σ ∈ Lα (such exists
since Π11-CA0 implies the reals are closed under the hyperjump; see [10]). Let
fII be the theory of Lα. Note that then Lα Σ1-projects to ω, since it is the
least admissible containing some real; in particular, it satisfies condition (∗).
Let fI = σ ∗ fII be the theory that σ responds to fII with.
Now σ is winning for I inG(F ); soMI is an ω-model. SinceMII is wellfounded,
(2) must fail, and since we assumed σ is winning for I, we have (1) holds; that
is, either fII ∈ MI or fI = fII. If fI = fII, then II was simply copying I’s play,
so that σ ∈ Lα = MI, implying fI ∈ MI, a contradiction to the fact that MI
ω-projects to ω.
So fII ∈ MI. The strategy σ is computable from fII, so must also belong to
MI. But then, since fI = σ ∗ fII, we again obtain the contradiction fI ∈MI. ⊣
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Claim 4.5. If there is no model with an infinite depth Σ2-nesting, then Player
II has no winning strategy in G(F ).
Proof. Towards a contradiction, let τ be a winning strategy for II; as in the
previous claim, we may assume τ ∈ L, and let α be the least admissible with
τ ∈ Lα. Put fI = Th(Lα); then fI satisfies the condition (∗). Let fII = τ ∗ fI be
τ ’s response.
We claim that if MII is the model so obtained, then wfo(MII) ≤ α (note
Π11-CA0 is enough to ensure the existence of (a real coding) the wellfounded
ordinal of MII). Suppose otherwise; then wfo(MII) > α, and then Lα ∈ MII.
Then fI = Th(Lα) and τ belongs to MII, so that fII = τ ∗ fI does as well. As
before, this contradicts the assumption that II wins the play; specifically, fII fails
to satisfy condition (∗).
So wfo(MII) ≤ α. We claimMII is illfounded. Otherwise, either o(MII) = α,
in which case we getMII = Lα =MI, in which case (1) holds and I wins; or else
o(MII) < α, so thatMII = Lγ for some γ < α, so that fII = Th(Lγ) ∈ Lα =MI,
and again (1) holds, contradicting that τ is winning for II.
So MII is illfounded with wfo(MII) ≤ α. Set β = wfo(MII). If there is no
model bearing an infinite depth Σ2-nesting, then by Lemma 4.1 there exists some
nonstandard MII-ordinal a, so that, for every nonstandard MII-ordinal b with
b ≤MII a, we have T b2 6⊆ T
β
2 . That is, for all such b, there is a Σ2 sentence σ so
that Lβ 6|= σ, but L
MII
b |= σ.
It is now straightforward to show β, a witness the winning condition (2). Set
a0 = a. Suppose inductively that ai is a nonstandardMII-ordinal with ai ≤
MII
a. Then by choice of a, there is some Σ2 formula σ so that L
MII
b |= σ and
Lβ 6|= σ; let σi be the least such under our fixed enumeration of formulae. If ai
is not limit in MII, take ai+1 to be the greatest limit ordinal of MII below ai;
note then ai+1 is also nonstandard and below a.
Now if ai is limit in MII, we have that σi is of the form (∃u)(∀v)ψ(u, v) for
some ∆0 formula ψ. Let ai+1 be least so that for some x ∈ L
MII
ai+1
, we have
LMIIai |= (∀v)ψ(x, v). Then ai+1 <
MII ai, and since Lβ 6|= σi, we must have that
ai+1 is nonstandard. Thus the construction proceeds, and we have that I wins
the play 〈fI, fII〉 via condition (2). So τ cannot be a winning strategy. ⊣
These claims combine to show that if there is no model with an infinite depth
Σ2 nesting, then neither player has a winning strategy in the game G(F ). This
completes the proof of the theorem. ⊣
We have thus shown that Σ03 determinacy implies the existence of a model
satisfying Π12-MI, and indeed, of some ordinal γ so that Lγ |= Π
1
2-MI. The
meticulous reader will observe, however, that our proof of determinacy in Sec-
tion 2 really only made use of ¬aΣ03 monotone inductive definitions. This may
at first appear strange, in light of the fact that ¬aΣ03 is a much smaller class
than Π12. This situation is clarified somewhat by the following theorem, which
shows that if γ is minimal with Lγ |= Π
1
2-MI, then the Π
1
2 relations that are
correctly computed in Lγ are precisely the ¬aΣ
0
3 relations.
Theorem 4.6. Let γ be the least ordinal so that Lγ satisfies Π
1
2-MI. Let z be
a real in Lγ, and suppose Φ(u) is a Σ
1
2 formula. Then there is a aΣ
0
3 relation Ψ
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so that, for all reals x of Lγ, we have Lγ satisfies Φ(x) if and only if Ψ(x) holds
(in V , or equivalently, in Lγ).
Proof. Fix such a formula Φ(x). Then there is a recursive tree T on ω3 so
that for all x, Φ(x) holds if and only if for some y, T〈x,y〉 is wellfounded. We
define a version of the game from Theorem 4.2. This time, for a fixed real x,
each player is required to produce their respective ω-models MI,MII satisfying
V = L(x) +KP + ρω = ω.(∗∗)
In addition, MI must satisfy the sentence “(∃y)T〈x,y〉 is ranked”; whereas MII
must satisfy its negation. If a winner has not been decided on the basis of one
of these conditions being violated, then Player I wins if either of the conditions
(1), (2) from the proof of Theorem 4.2 hold. Let Fx be the set of f ∈ ωω so
that Player I wins the play of the game on x, where 〈fI, fII〉, where fI(n) =
f(2n), fII(n) = f(2n+1) for all n. Let F = {〈x, f〉 | f ∈ Fx}. Then F is Σ03; let
Ψ(x) be the statement “I has a winning strategy in the game G(Fx)”.
Suppose x ∈ Lγ is such that Lγ |= Φ(x). We claim Ψ(x) holds; that is, Player
I has a winning strategy in G(Fx). Let y be a witness to truth of Φ, and let α
be least such that y ∈ Lα(x) and Lα(x) |= KP. Then by admissibility, Lα(x)
contains a ranking function for T〈x,y〉. Let σ be the strategy for I that always
produces the theory of Lα(x). We claim σ is winning for Player I.
Suppose towards a contradiction thatMII is the model produced by a winning
play by II against σ; we can assume MII ∈ Lγ . Then MII is an ω-model. It
cannot be wellfounded, since then it would be of the form Lβ(x) for some β;
but we can’t have β ≥ α (since MII cannot contain y, or else it would have a
ranking function for T〈x,y〉), nor can β < α hold (since then (1) is satisfied, and
I wins the play). So MII is illfounded, say with wfo(MII) = β; by a similar
argument, β < α. Now since I does not win the play, the condition (2) fails, so
there must be some infinite depth Σ2-nesting based onMII, by Lemma 4.1. But
this contradicts the fact that the model MII belongs to Lγ , by minimality of γ
and Theorem 3.11.
Conversely, suppose Φ(x) fails in Lγ . Suppose towards a contradiction that
Player I wins the game G(Fx) (in V ); then by Theorem 2.1, there is such a
strategy σ ∈ Lγ . Let MII be the least level of L(x) containing σ. Note that
MII |= (∗∗) + “(∀y)T〈x,y〉 is not ranked”. By the argument in the proof of
Theorem 4.2, we obtain failure of both (1) and (2), so that II wins the play, a
contradiction to σ being a winning strategy. ⊣
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